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A 1 rights reserved . No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any clcctronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or informarion storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher. It's hard enough arguing that the research program of Al will eventually succeed. But it seems to many people that it could succeed completely and still not provide a theory of phenomenal consciousness. I use the term "phenomenal" to make it clear that I am not talking about other concepts of consciousness . There are several other kinds to check off:
" Not being asleep : You are conscious in this sense when you aren't unconscious .
" Attentiveness : You can be unaware that there is a high-pitched hum in your vicinity until someone points it out.
" Accessibility to report: You are unconscious of what your brain does when it processes visual information; you are conscious of what you do when you are looking for your glasses, but unconscious of what makes you more attuned to glasses-shaped objects when you're looking .
" consciousness as being aware of oneself: In playing chess you might be conscious of your sweaty hands and pounding heart, or you might be focused entirely on the game, and hence "unconscious" or at least "unselfconscious ."
All of these are of interest, but none of them constitutes the "hard problem" of consciousnesss, to use David Chalmers's phrase. The hard problem is that red things look a certain way to me, different from green . I might be able to build a computer that could distinguish red things from green ones, but, at first glance, it doesn't seem as if either color would look "a certain way" to the computer. The way things are experienced by conscious beings are called the qualia of those things, and explaining what it is to have qualia is the hard problem of consciousness. When it's Chapter 3 iinportant to focus our attention on this meaning of the word "conscious," l will use the term "phenomenal consciousness ." r As I said, it looks at first as if computational models could never explain < phenomenal consciousness . They just don't trade in the correct currency. r 'l hey talk about inputs, outputs, and computations, but sensations of any v ()f these things don't enter in . Hence it seems logically possible that there c :-;, uld be a computer that made exactly the same sensory discriminations lã s a person, and yet experienced nothing at all. What I would like to argue iii this chapter is that, if there is ever such a thing as an intelligent robot, lien it will have to exhibit something very much like consciousness . I will r then take the further step of arguing that this something is exactly what we c
Mean by human consciousness, in spite of our intuitions to the contrary. F Before I make those arguments, let me remind you of the main argument ii oaf chapters 1 and 2 . As long as the brain remains poorly understood, is there will always be room to assume that some noncomputational essence witliin it makes consciousness happen . However, it may not remain that ip oorly understood much longer. We can already map the nervous systems a of very simple creatures (leeches with only a few dozen neurons), and we t] get the same intuitions as when we look at computers : we can see what is if happening in the nervous system, we can model it perfectly well as a kind
Aaf computation, and we can see the absence of experience . So to maintain c.
i belief in dualism we have to believe that the human brain contains b structures that are quite different from those in leeches, structures that n would cause experience to happen . The problem is that we have no idea h w.-hat those structures might be . Worse, to the extent we do understand a what's going on in the brains of humans and other mammals, the events td on't seem to be qualitatively different from what goes on in the "brains"
Si o f leeches. Sooner or later, I predict, we're going to be faced with trying to explain ti consciousness without resort to any structures or mechanisms that are to significantly different from the ones we now understand. If you think this n is preposterous, then you may not be able to follow the argument much ti fi.arther. On the other hand, if you find unsatisfactory all the other prop F,osals that have been made (Penrose 1994 ; Chalmers 1996 ; O'Brien and r ; )pie 1999), then perhaps you will bear with me . I will warn you, however, t'riat a computationalist explanation of consciousness will inevitably sound a it will base its modeling activity on the assumption that R will be carrying out those actions . Now suppose that the actual situation is that the robot is standing next to a bomb with a lit fuse . And suppose that the robot knows all this, so that in its model R is standing next to B, a bomb with a lit fuse. The model is accurate enough that it will predict that B will explode. Supposing that the robot has no actions on its agenda that would make it move, the model will predict that R will be destroyed.
Well, actually it can't make this prediction with certainty, because R will be destroyed only if it doesn't roll away quickly. The conclusion that it would not roll away was based on the robot's own current projection of what it is going to do . But such projections are subject to change . For instance, the robot might be waiting for orders from its owner ; a new order would make it roll away. More interestingly, the robot might have a standing order to avoid damage. Whenever its model predicts that it is going to be damaged, it should discard its current action list and replace it with actions that will protect it, assuming it can find some. Finding actions to achieve goals is a deep and fascinating topic, but it needn't concern us here . The robot concludes it should exit the room, and does so . What I want to call attention to is how this sequence of events is represented in the robot's model, and how that will have to differ from reality .
The reality is that the robot's actions are entirely caused by events . The sequence I laid out is a straightforward causal chain, from perception, to tentative prediction, to action revision . But this causal chain cannot be represented accurately in the model, because a key step of the chain, the making of tentative predictions, involves the model itself. The model could not capture this causal chain because then it would have to include a complete model of itself, which is incoherent . In other words, some of the causal antecedents of R's behavior are situated in the very causal-analysis
box that is trying to analyze them. The robot might believe that R is a robot, and hence that a good way to predict R's behavior is to simulate it on a faster CPU, but this strategy will be in vain, because this particular robot is itself. No matter how fast it simulates R, at some point it will reach the point where R looks for a faster CPU, and it won't be able to do that simulation fast enough. Or it might try inspecting R's listing, but eventually it will come to the part of the listing that says "inspect R's Chapter 3 lc)I,.ation of the pain, not just the fact that it is a pain. Experience arises as ari aspect of the way these messages are processed ; it is not a separate process in which we become aware of the existence and nature of the 1iis."ssage itself . The message says where the pain is; otherwise there is ii( , way in the world the brain could know where it comes from . That's xti, hy a lesion in the nervous system can cause pain to be experienced ilu a place far from the lesion . The lesion causes bogus messages to be se17t, and their content is to some extent arbitrary; it would be a mere ccWtlcidence if the message happened to mention the exact location where thc. ' lesion is . ] i)f course, none of this explains what subjective experience actually is . 13tit it does clear away a whole class of problems that have vexed philosophers. Perhaps the others will also succumb to a computational exi7,lanation .
I \vill start the explanation with a little warmup, explaining the pheIic~menon of free will . Many people have thought that free will has something to do with phenomenal consciousness . I actually don't think that, i)ut they do have explanations that are similar in form .
Suppose we have a robot that models the world temporally and uses its riwdel to predict what will happen . I am not talking about "mental modcls" gas the term is used in psychology (Johnson-haird thllt the robot is modeling the situation it is now actually in . This model iticlades various symbols, including one I'll call R, which it uses to denote its If. l dealt with the idea that computers manipulate symbols in chapter Z, and will discuss it at greater length later, especially in chapter 5 .
Wheel 1 say the symbol denotes the robot itself, I don't mean to imply that the word "itself" implies something about "self." All I mean is that, for-example, when it detects an object in its environment, it notes that R i, :nc~,4vs the object is present; and when it has a tentative course of action i)n aalld, that is, a series of orders to be transmitted to its effector motors, is,"
like "explaining away" rather than true explanation. Almost any materialist explanation, even the correct one, is going to have this problem The strongest conclusion it can reach is that "If R doesn't roll Xvay, it will be destroyed ; if it does roll away, it won't be ." And then of COurse this conclusion causes the robot to roll away.
l-lence the robot must model itself in a different way from other objects .
_l4,1eir behavior may be modeled as caused, but its own (i .e ., R's) must be modeled as "open," or "still being solved for." The symbol R must be w irked as exempt from causal laws when predictions are being made about the actions it will take . The word "must" here is just the "must" of rational design. It would be pointless to use a modeling system for control co behavior that didn't make this distinction; and it would be unlikely for ev0ltition to produce one .
ikny system that models its own behavior, uses the output of the model rc3 select among actions, and has beliefs about its own decisions, will be°lieve that its decisions are undetermined . What I would like to claim is that this is what free will comes down to:
E A ",ystein has free will if and only if it makes decisions based on causal models iñ ti-iiicli the symbols denoting itself are marked as exempt from causality.
this definition, people have free will, and probably so do many mammals . There are probably many borderline cases, in which an animal has <1 rudimentary causal model, but the exemption from causality is given to its self symbols by building in some kind of blind spot, so that the cii i estion can't come up, rather than by providing a belief system in which there are peculiar beliefs involving the self symbol .
People lose their freedom when they cease to believe that their decisions depend on their deliberations. If you fall out of an airplane without i parachute, you may debate all you like about whether to go down or u17, but you know your deliberation has no effects. More subtly, an alcolic~lic or drug addict may go through the motions of deciding whether to indulge in his vice, but he doesn't really believe the decision is a real one .
-%N/hat's the use," he might think, "I've decided every other morning to li~tvc a drink; I know I'm just going to make the same decision ; I might as well have one." In this case the belief in one's own impotence might be dclusional, but it's self-fulfilling. One can contrast the addict's situation
With the decision of whether to take a breath. You can postpone breathing M] :ly so long ; at some point the question whether to breathe or not seems s-+a lae "taken out of your hands." The alcoholic classes his decision to take ti Uurnpuauczonuc i rivury v/~.vrc~c,c~w~racoo a drink as similar to a decision to take a breath. He no longer believes in his freedom, and he has thereby lost it .
The obvious objection to this account is that it declares a certain natural phenomenon to be free will, when introspection seems to proclaim that, whatever free will is, it isn't that. It appears to identify free will with a belief in free will, and surely the two can't be the same . It's as if I declared that divinity is a belief that one is God, so that any schizophrenic who thought he was God would be divine . This objection might have some weight if I actually did identify free will with a belief in free will, but I don't. Rather, I identify free will with a belief in exemption from causal laws. The alternative formulation is not just implausible, but vacuous.
Still, this identification of free will with a certain computational property may seem disappointingly trivial. It has nothing to do with autonomy, morality, or the worth of the individual, at least not at first glance . I admit all this. Unfortunately, this is the only concept of free will the universe is likely to provide . Many volumes have been written about how freedom might find a place in a world subject to physical laws, and no one has ever succeeded in explaining what that might mean. Some find comfort in the indeterminacy of quantum mechanics, or even in the lack of predictability in the classical laws of physics, but freedom surely doesn't mean randomness. Some suppose that free decisions are those that "might have been otherwise," but it is notoriously difficult to say what this means. So we are in the odd position of being introspectively certain of something that makes no sense .
In such a situation, the problem should shift to explaining why we have that introspective view, not how it might actually be true after all . Once we make that shift, the problem resolves very simply, along the lines I have indicated.
Some may find this to be a scary tactic, with implications that may be hard to control. What else are we going to throw overboard as we proceed? Suppose we show that moral intuitions are incoherent . Do we then simply shift to explaining why we have moral intuitions? Does that mean that we need not be bound by moral intuitions?
I admit to finding this scary myself, but the case of free will gives us a bit of reassurance . Even though I accept my account of free will, it doesn't change the way I think about my actions . As many philosophers
Chapter 3 (»cmtably William James) have pointed out, it makes no sense to order one's life as though we could not make free choices. A statement of the w form, "Because we can't make decisions, we should . . . " is silly, because w anr-statement about what we "should" do presupposes that we can make decisions . We're stuck with free will. w 1 his dismissal of qualms is more glib than I intend . I will come back be to this topic later (chapter 6) . But first, let us see if the method used to 11, explain free will will also explain, or explain away, qualia . th Let's look more carefully at the structure of deliberate choices . Suppose 11, I robot is built to sense and avoid extreme heat. One way to make it avoid ac heal: is to build in reflexes, analogous to those that cause animals to jerk it bac=k suddenly when they touch something hot. But a reflex won't get the sa robot out of a burning building . That requires planning and executing a f;( lonh string of actions . The detection of heat, and the prediction that it's m gc:~iug to get worse, must cause the robot to have an urgent goal of getting th cyst of the situation it's in . A goal in artificial-intelligence terminology is ,A St rructure describing a state of affairs a system is to try to bring about. th In this case the goal is "that R [the robot] be out of the building ." The w robot might have other goals, such as "that R know whether any human be is in the building ." bê 1 he interaction between goals can be complicated . Suppose the robot's n< sc1,ca rnd goal (call it G2) was an order given when there was no reason to M believe that there were any persons left in the building . Then the robot's in cr-,veers might prefer that it save itself (goal G1) rather than continue to do search for people who probably don't exist. On the other hand, if fewer A peoi~le can be accounted for outside the building than were believed to is have been inside, then G2 would take precedence. But even though the w: robot decides not to flee the building right away, this is not a decision it can "F Just make and forget . As the heat becomes more intense, the probability an that it will be destroyed increases . There may come a point when wasting kr a perfectly good robot for a negligible chance of saving humans may seem is foolish . I am not assuming that every intelligent creature must have an an innate and overriding desire for self-preservation . It should be possible to 11cailc a robot with no desire at all to preserve itself. But we may as well th, I rn lgine that the builders of the robot put in a desire to avoid destruction ha of tl~e robot just so it would allow its own destruction only when its hil owners wanted it to.
dl;
It may sound odd to require a robot to have a "desire" for something . A creature without preferences can behave, but it cannot make deas liberate choices . Nowadays air-to-air missiles are programmed to avoid t's heading toward an airplane with a "Friend or Foe" signal that identifies it scat as a friend . An intelligent attack robot might want to be able to entertain sh the hypothesis that a friendly aircraft had been captured by the enemy. It is would have to weigh its repulsion away from the possibility of attacking 'ly. an aircraft labeled friendly against its attaction toward the possibility of he destroying the enemy pilot sitting in that aircraft .
ke In science fiction, robots and androids are often portrayed as being ke without "emotion ." In a typical plot, an android will be portrayed as
Ilyunable to love or laugh (until a special experimental chip is added) . It is, tie however, able to carry on a conversation, have multiple goals, and decide is on different courses of action . It often prefers deduction to induction, Lo and is usually driven by curiosity. In other words, it is not without preferences, it just prefers different things than the average human does. If you :'d ask it, why do you spend time trying to find out about humans instead of studying more mathematics, it will give answers like "Humans have aid always fascinated me ." If you ask it, why do you help the Rebel Alliance g. and not the Evil Empire, it will give answers like, "I find the Emperor and yn his minions suboptimal," as if robots, as ultrarational beings, would have y.
an inherent tendency to try to make situations optimal, without actually 11:ciii1putations which I will print out if you wish ." The problem is that t t Q , to "t extend this way of thinking into talking about the future . If you ask, "Should we go left or right?" the android will refuse to answer the (uesticm on the grounds that it has no preference one way or the other.
You have to ask it, "Given the following criteria, should we go left or and then spell them out.
YOU might suppose that you could tell the robot, "Adopt the following cr%t,;,ria until I countermand them," but that just means imagining the Original android again . It doesn't adopt the criteria for any reason ("You mad read my program. . . "), and once they are adopted they become its unquestionable reasons for further decisions . There is no difference be-( ik~ly, but the science-fiction author never said the android didn't have preferences . She said that it didn't have emotions . It's interesting that tõ , aiilvev this fact the writer has the android behave as a human would if the litr11aan were heavily sedated or in shock . As long as the android doesn't llati a:~emotions, why not have it chuckle occasionally just to brighten the days of the people around it? f1"lle question is, however, whether there can be preferences without entcatic ns. Emotions seem to have three components : a belief, a prefereilce. , and a qua le peculiar to each emotion. Fear is a belief that something i likely to happen, a preference that it not, and a set of sensations pecu-1 ;,:ir toy fear. Regret is the belief that something has already happened, a (-,refereilce that it hadn't, and a different set of peculiar sensations . is thinking about is perception, not action. The robot has just made a perceptual mistake. It saw a straight object that it took to be bent . It stuck f a stick into a pool of water and observed the stick change chape. However, t after doing various experiments, such as feeling the object as it entered the water, it decides that the stick never actually bends, it just appears to.
This story sounds plausible, because we've all experienced it ourselves, one way or another. Actually, there is no robot today that could go through this sequence of events, for several reasons. First, computer vision is not good enough to extract arbitrary, possibly surprising information from a scene. A typical vision system, if pointed at a stick in a tub of water, would probably misinterpret the highlights reflected from the water surface and fai I to realize that it was looking at a tub of water with a stick thrust into it . Assuming it didn't stumble there, and assuming it was programmed to look for sticks, it might fit a line to the stick boundary and get a straight stick whose orientation was halfway between the orientation above the water level and the orientation below. Or it might see one half of the stick, or two sticks .
Even if we look forward to a time when computer vision systems work a lot better than they do now, there are still some gaps . There has been very little work on "cross-modality sensor fusion," which in this case means the ability to combine information from multiple senses to get an overall hypothesis about what's out there . No robot now is dexterous enough to feel the shape of a stick, but even if it were there would still be the problem of combining the input from that module with the input from , the vision module to get an overall hypothesis . The combination method has to be clever enough to know when to reject one piece of information completely ; taking some kind of average of the output of each sense will not be useful in the case of the unbent stick .
Even if we assume this problem can be solved, we still don't have the 'dXle"re still not there ; we still don't have the entire scenario . The robot Is11't in a position to say that the stick appeared to be bent . Two elements the trc missing: The first is that the robot may not remember that it thought t:hu stick was bent . For all we know, the robot forgets its earlier report as do soon as it makes its new one . That's easy to fix, at least in our thought res C-N:!.~enment; as long as we're going far beyond the state of the art in artificial intelligence, let's assume that the robot remembers its previous t h,-reports . That leaves the other element, which is the ability to perceive the Th Mitput of sensory systems . As far as the robot is concerned, the fact that eve it reported that the stick was bent is an unexplained brute fact. It can't yet no sav that the stick "appeared to be" anything. It can say, "I concluded bent
IIWi then I concluded straight, rejecting the earlier conclusion ." That's all.
be,]
I'llis may seem puzzling, because we think the terms in which we reaair ,a0sr :about our perceptions are natural and inevitable . Some perceptual eN ctits are accessible to consciousness, while others are not, because of the c<» , , crv nature of those events . But the boundary between the two is really quite arbitrary. For instance, I can tell you when something looks three-( thL J i niensiornal, whether it is or not . I know when I look through a sterebe] 0'~k"cape that I'm really looking at two slightly different two-dimensional me 1 1 . 1 could be aware of the correspondences and disparities, plus the inference (the depths of each piece of the image) that I draw from it . In the case of the stereoscope I might continue to perceive the disparities, but refuse to draw the inference of depth and decide that the object is really 2-D .
2 . 1 could be aware of the depths, but, in the case of the stereoscope, decide the objects is 2-D . (This is the way we're actually built.)
,t 3 . I could be unaware of the depth and aware only of the overall inference, s that I'm looking at a 2-D object consisting of two similar pictures . tl l1ence a key step in the evolution of intelligence is the ability to "detach" n,HC+dules from the normal flow of data processing . The brain reacts to the i (Ritput of a module in two ways : as information about the world, and tX " information about that module. We can call the former normal access I and the latter introspective access to the module . For a robot to be able to report that the stick appeared to be bent, it must have introspective ac. ::ess to its visual-perception module .
'so far I have used the phrase "aware of" to describe access to percepts P SLI :lI as the true and apparent shape of a stick . This phrase is dangerous, C l)a,+, a use it seems to beg the question of phenomenal consciousness . I need it a phrase to use when I mean to say that a robot has "access to" a representation, without any presupposition that the access involves phenomenal consciousness. The phrase I adopt is "cognizant of." z h ['here is another tricky issue that arises in connection with the concept iõ f cognizance, and that is who exactly is cognizant. If I say that a person U is not cognizant of the disparities between left and right eye, it is obvious tl v,; fiat I mean . But in talking about a robot with stereo vision, I have lc to distinguish in a non-question-begging way between the ability of the o robot's vision system to react to disparities and the ability of the robot "=> tot react to them . What do I mean by "robot" over and above its vision tl svstetn, its motion-planning system, its chess-playing system, and its other a n1CIdules? This is an issue that will occupy us for much of the rest of this v bc>i;& For now, I'm going to use a slightly dubious trick, and assume that -A, 6atever one might mean by "the robot as a whole," it's that entity that w,_'rc talking to when we talk to the robot. This assumption makes sense tl only if we can talk to the robot. c 1 say this trick is dubious for several reasons . One is that in the previit otrs Chapter I admitted that we are far from possessing a computational t theory of natural language . By using language as a standard part of my s illustrations, I give the impression of a huge gap in the theory of robot i consciousness. I risk giving this impression because it is accurate ; there are several huge gaps in the theory, and we might as well face up to them as we 1 go . Another risk in bringing language in is that I might be taken as saying that without language a system cannot be conscious, which immediately t makes animals, infants, and maybe even stroke victims unconscious. In the long run we will have to make this dependence on language go away. Note that current vision systems, to the extent that they're cognizant of anything, are not cognizant of the two-dimensional qualities of the images they manipulate . They extract information from two-dimensional arrays of numbers (see chapter 2), but having passed it on, they discard the arrays. It would be possible in principle to preserve this feature of the introspective abilities of robots, even if they became very intelligent. That is, they could use visual information to extract information very reliably from the environment, but would never be able to think of the image itself as an object accessible to examination .
So far, so good ; we have begun to talk about the way things appear to a perceptual system, but we still haven't explained phenomenal con-
sciousness . That appears only in connection with certain kinds of introspection, to which we now turn . I I X'_;~'ued above tha n robot must assign values to different sensor inputs, iyu : that's not the sarne thing as "feeling" them differently. We can imagine a r")bot attaching a number between -10 and 10 to every input, so that a ,lo:,e of radiation and a fire might both get -9, but there must be more to it, or the robot wouldn't distinguish the two at all . You might have two p«iras, one shooting and one throbbing, that were equally unpleasant, but rhey wouldn't feel the same .
()f course no robot has a problem distinguishing one sensory input from ,ara()ther. The robot, we suppose, has several different sensors, and their reports do not get mixed up. A signal coming from the vision system does riot get confused with a signal coming from the auditory system. Within ' , ,iven sensory system there is similarly little possibility of confusion. A high-pitched sound yields one signal, a low-pitched sound another.
Nonetheless, the question of how we distinguish a high-pitched sound from a low-pitched one can cause confusion. We're asking the reason for r judgment, and, as in the case of asking for the reasons for a decision, it c is easy to mix this up with a request for the cause of the judgment . The Let's look closely at the sense system that has exercised philosophers the r11 Ost, color vision . Let's start by supposing that a robot reacts to colors iñ r w:ay isomorphic to ours. That is, its vision system is implemented using a system of three color filters sensitive in the same ranges as ours (Clark 1993 ) , implemented with our visual pigments, or in some equivalent way.
[,he robot cannot in principle make color judgments any finer than ours . identical to people, it would classify them as identical also. We may also suppose that its judgments are not coarser than ours ; it uses just as much 1,1 l >el everything whose color looks similar to tree leaves . There will be lots Of borderline cases, but that just reflects the boundaries in the underlying similarity space .
ow suppose we show the robot some pictures, and ask it to find the green object in each picture, if there is one. Obviously, this requires m<inv visual skills besides the ability to label colors, but we are allowing ourselves to be ambitious for the purpose of these thought experiments .
Sc cN e can assume the robot can find familiar object shapes in pictures, 111d c:an correctly assign colors to shapes . ,cxt, the robot looks at two pictures, and says that picture A contains nc, r;reen objects and picture B contains a picture of a green house . Now we ash it to tell us how it knows that. It points to the house and says, "Look!"
V-'(? explain that we are philosophers, and do not want the evidence ; we w; nt to know why the robot takes it to be evidence . The robot would say it~:locsti't know why. We point to a house in picture A, and ask, what's rhc difference between this and the green house in picture B? The robot wt )7. lcl say, if forced to say anything, that house B "looks like" other green objects, and that house A "looks like" other blue objects. It could iio}r possibly say anything else, because similarity judgments are the only l i rr h: between the color-processing system and the language system. All ,J-cell objects have something in common, the property of looking similar rc7 each other, but as far as the robot is able to report, this is an irreducible pi-operty, a stopping point. The property they all have in common is right iii from of the robot's face, but it can't be analyzed, at least not by the p~rrt of the robot that is connected to the speech system . This something Ways the role in the robot that the quale of the color plays in the human rr~zaad.
[ thing that looks different. If asked to find other shapes in other paintin"s that resemble A or B, it would find shapes that were filled with the saric "whatever it is" that fills A or B, or something "close ."
My argument shows that if a robot were cognizant of judgments cif color similarity that were structurally equivalent to humans', then th . y would be, as far as the robot could tell, introspectively equivalent, ariel hence the robot would believe that its experiences had qualia-like propc-i --ties. However, as I have emphasized before, there is no reason that everr , robot would have to have judgments that were structurally equivalent to a human's . The robot might well have introspective access to col,r as a vector of three numbers (corresponding to the outputs of the thr-, .,e color filtors), or four numbers, or the Fourier transform of the light . The robot might classify colors in roughly the same way we do, but with sitnificant differences in the similarity relationships of the type that lra -e been discovered by psychophysicists (Clark 1993 
Vlost of my examples have been drawn from the domain of vision, but i
the story is much the same in other areas . One peculiarity of many sensory 1 systems is that their spatial field corresponds roughly to the entire body. I A tickle is felt as being in a particular place on (or in) the body of the c hersoii being tickled . Another peculiarity is that some senses don't seem to~:onvey any information beyond the fact that they're occurring. A tickle t dc,esn't announce the presence of anything but a tickle . Vision, by conc trust. , normally simply delivers information about the physical positions t of , :ahjects outside an organism, and it takes some effort to be cognizant lv of the structure of the appearances of those objects separate from those :i objects. A computational model C is a computational system that resembles a ITIi>deled system S in some respect and is used by a modeling system M to pi edict the behavior of S. A self-model arises when S = M. This may seem acs unusual situation, but in fact it is common . Here are some examples :
N Computer that takes inventory of the furniture in an office may include 1
Itself in the inventory. If it is predicting future furniture needs, it may ric~te that the computer (itself) will become obsolete and is planned to be l replaced by a smaller, faster model in six months .
real-time compiler models the time required for various operations ' it is producing code . The time depends on the computer the code )A, .1 I run on. Here S = M if the computer the code will run on is the same i as the computer executing the compiler. i
. A robot must decide how much planning to do before starting to carry 1 its plan out. In some cases (Boddy and Dean 1989 ; Russell and Wefald 1~.'9l ), it can use a statistical model of the expected benefit to be gained h, ; further planning . It should spend only as much time planning as may 1 be expected to yield an improved plan that saves more than that amount c t time . Because the planner and the agent that will carry out the plan are ' tic same, the statistical model qualifies as a self-model . 1 e " Some robot hand-eye control systems look at their own grippers o ("hands") as well as the objects they are manipulating . In figuring out e the future trajectories of the objects, such a system must use a different a model for objects it is gripping than for objects lying on the table . The y self-model takes into account the movements the robot plans to undertake .
The last example is of a type that will become especially important as robots become more common . It attacks a problem that all animals face, namely, making sure they distinguish between self and nonself.
A key feature of humans' self-models is that they are unitary. it is implausible to imagine modeling them all, one could easily imagine modeling oneself as a community of modules (Minsky 1986) . This is, How shall we describe such a case? "I was absent-minded; I forgot where I was ." True, but what was really going on, once I was in the bathroom, was that I was just behaving as I usually do. I didn't actually I-here is another sort of example. I have noticed that when I become i t: i f 1 fitI at a computer game (an activity induldged in for purely scientific s C<tsOns), the little creatures crawling acrQss the screen seem to slow down . 1 l'or instance, in the game of Gnibbles a worm crawls rapidly through a 1 raze. If it hits a wall it dies . At first it seems impossible to control the worm . Before you can react, it crashes into something. However, eventu-, .,:lly your nervous system gets "tuned" to the game. You anticipate what's i ";oing to happen, and now you seem to have all the time in the world i t t> steer the worm left or right. But occasionally a situation pops up that t you didn't anticipate, and before you can think the worm seems to speed r LIP, spin out of control, and smash into the nearest obstacle . That's the 1 way it seems, but the truth is that it the worm was never under conscious t t ontrol, whatever that might mean. The self-model was just verifying that t the worm was under control, and attributing that fact to decisions "you" \X , e don't normally think about this. We see an icon on the screen . It has 11 fa113iliar design, so we know that, say, it is a word-processing document, a rld i1E we click on it its contents will appear in the arrangement the word pre~c(ssor produces . From our point of view, the icon denotes the file .
hror3 the programmers' point of view things are a bit different, and it's their point of view we're interested in . There is a data object representing the file (and another, which we don't care about right now, that denotes the icon) . The denotation is as reliable as the computer repairperson can arlake it, but it has a peculiar feature : the existence of the data object is necessary to bring the denoted object into existence . Without such a data (abject: the file would dissolve into a bunch of disconnected bits. In fact, files are 11_ ually deleted not by actually erasing anything but by just removing tlie] r descriptors from the appropriate data structures and declaring their blocks ready for use in new files. 5
U, e see much the same pattern in the way the robot models the self.
1'l1CI e is, we suppose, a symbol for "L" The robot would exhibit some bch,Iviors whether it modeled itself or not, but some behaviors stem from the fact that it thinks about itself as a "person," that is, the fact that in its self-model the properties of a single entity with goals, emotions, and sons .itions are ascribed to "L" It behaves as such an entity because it nlrl(iels itself as such an entity ; its behavior is to some extent constituted b,a the modeling .
'I: lie question is, does this "I" exist over and above the creature that has <I MOdel in which "I" exists? The answer is not quite as straightforward as the ccn-responding answer about the file system, but it is similar in form .
The "I" in the model makes free decisions; does that bring a being with free will into existence? There are two rather different ways of answering the (question, but for both the answer is yes . First, if the robot asks, does s<: .)nleone with free will really exist, the answer is, yes, I do! That's because the robot can't step out of the model. It may understand completely that it bt-heves it is free only because it has a self-model with this belief, but that understanding does not allow it to escape the self-model and suspend that belief . one Second, the humans that interact with the robot, and other robots, al i,> for that matter, will perceive the owner of the model as being a creature with the same attributes it assigns to "L" People begin assuming at an has early age that other people are making the kind of decisions and having :ant, the kind of experiences that they are having. A child learns the word for ord a concept by hearing the word when the thing it denotes is perceptually hle . salient. Learning the word "choice" is no different from learning the word it's "chair." When the child is trying to decide between chocolate and vanilla, ing and her parents are urging her to make a "choice," then the cognitive >tes state she is in gets labeled as a choice . Its classification as a type of state pan is prior to that point and presumably is an innate part of her self-model . t is When she later hears the word applied to other people, she assumes they ata are in a similar state of indecision . It is plausible to assume that intelligent lies robots, if they ever exist, will attribute to other robots the same properties ing they automatically perceive true of themselves .
eir Because of processes like this, intelligent robots would perceive other robots as selves similar to "I ." In other words, one way the symbol "I" brings its denotation into being is by encouraging its owner to deal with me other entities as though they all were creatures similar to the way it believes 7n~ "I" to be. The robot's brain is making its "I" up as it goes along, but the in process works the way it does partly because other intelligent systems are nd cooperating to make everyone else up too . Robot 1 believes Robot 2 to it have (or be) a self like its own "I," so the self that the symbol "I" in ed Robot 2's model denotes is also denoted by whatever symbol Robot 1 uses for Robot 2.
gas There is one aspect of the self-model that we mustn't be too casual as about. If we are not careful, the model will come to occupy the position m. of the spectator at the internal mental show in what Dennett (1991) calls th the "Cartesian theater," the part that actually experiences. This is not rig the correct picture at all . There is no part that experiences. Experience es inheres in the whole system, just as life inheres in a whole cell . A cell se is alive but has no living parts, and the brain experiences but has no ,1t
experiencing parts. The self-model is just another module in a collection Lit of computational modules. It is fair to say that the self-model is a crucial 7d component in the mechanism for maintaining the illusion that there is a Cartesian theater: it keeps track of the beliefs about the audience . To
Chapter .3 a i ry ,,>ut this role, it must have some special properties . One is that it is on nected fairly directly to the parts of the system that are responsible for guage . Another is that its conclusions are available for general-purpose in ft :-,retices . This second property is stated somewhat vaguely, so much so rl < t the first property might be a special case of it. The reason I am htli ng vague is that I really don't know what "general-purpose inference"
; .n-. ;ounts to . But it seems as if a key purpose of introspection is the ability rc7 acquire new capacities by reinterpreting sensory inputs. One learns dirit~t stick that appears bent in water is really straight . The fact that it " tt ;°Opears bent" must be represented somewhere, and somehow associated wi , di the inference that it "is actually straight ." Where this association cx Curs is not known, but presumably it isn't the job of the module that not-n-1ally measures the straightness of visible objects. It's not the job of All all-l.owerft l self-model either. All the self-model does is reinterpret the mpttt from other modules as information about perception and action,
;hen feed it to where it can take part in inferences.
it: may not be too early to speculate about where in the brain the self-model is located. Michel Gazzaniga (1998,p . 175) locates it in the left hc :msphere, associated with the speech centers. He calls it "the interpreter." ! iic insertion of an interpreter into an otherwise functioning brain delivers all i,ds of by-products . A device that asks how infinite numbers of things relate 0 Cash other and gleans productive answers to that question can't help but give th to the concept of self. Surely one of the questions that device would ask is "NVfic7 is solving these problems?" Call that "me," and away the problem goes! 1 i(Iwever, it's likely that the self-model will not be a localized "black box" in the brain . The brain can't ship signals to arbitrary places to take part in ,. :oniputations the way electronic circuits do . If a computation involves t v, o signals, the signals are usually generated close to where they will be trscd . Hence we would expect every piece of the brain to contain neurons that react to what the brain is doing as a brain activity instead of simply as a rCPresentation of events outside the body. Where the signals from these neurons go is a matter for speculation by someone who knows more about the brain than I do .
One key aspect of the self-model is that it seems to be connected to ellrsodic memory. In our survey of AI in chapter 2, we touched on various programs that learn things (such as maps and ways of winning games), but one thing they don't learn is what happened to them. TD-Gammon may play better backgammon because of a particular series of games it played, but it doesn't remember those games as particular events. The ability to remember and recall particular events is called episodic memory.
People take this ability for granted, but it is really quite strange when you get down to it. Remembering an event is not simply recording a movie of it, not even a movie with synchronized sound track, smell track, and touch track. Memory is highly selective and not terribly reliable. One wonders why evolution would give rise to such a thing . Learning a skill, such as pitching horseshoes or playing backgammon, does not require remembering episodes in which that skill would have come in handy.
Presumably simple organisms can only learn skills, and have no memory at all of the events along the way. you might remember that episode, and you might begin to clarify the differences between the sound of the telephone and the sound of the alarm.
One thing episodic memory and natural language have in common is that they seem to require general-purpose notations. If the brain doesn't know exactly why it's remembering something, it can't, as it were, "optimize" its notation for that purpose . It just has to strive to record "everything," even stuff that it might have thought was irrelevant . The natural-language system is similar in that it has to be able to talk about Chapter 3 "e\ erything ." I use quotes to remind you that the goal of a notation that caI-: express everything is far-fetched and not well defined. It is highly unlikely, that the brain comes close . Nonetheless, it comes closer here than iia,-,where else, and here is where the self-model plays a key role in giving it s, a, nrething to express .
The link between the self-model and natural language allows us to cA[slain why "cognizance" is so closely tied to the ability to report, and Allows us at the same time to break the link between them . We now see that to be cognizant of a state of affairs is for some representation of it to be <rccesslble to the self-model . That is, one is cognizant of a state of affairs I i f there is a representation of A such that that representation could itself be an object of perception (although on particular occasions it may T ie~er become one ) .6 In the normal course of things, one can report about whit is in the self-model, so it's not surprising that one can report about tvh.t t cane is cognizant of. However, in the case of a stroke or some other rICUrological problem the link can be broken, and cognizance could occur without the ability to report on anything. Some animals may have selfMOa'~els even without language, and a robot certainly could be designed rco have one without the other. If it seems hard to visualize, just reflect on the limits to one's own linguistic reporting ability. You can be cognizant Of the difference between red and blue, but you can't describe it, except pointing to red and blue things . Imagine having similar limits to other sorts of reports.
h is worthwhile to stop here and conduct a thought experiment about the strong connection between cognizance and language . What would a conscious entity be like if it could use language but not be able to talk
;a bout what it was aware of? At first glance it seems that there could be no such being. It is certainly hard to imagine what its mental life would be like . You might picture a sort of aphasia : such a creature would be able to talk about everything that was visible and tangible, but encounter some sort of block, or gap, when it tried to talk about its own experiences. It's hard to imagine this species as a real possibility, let alone as something that aa;c rrld be likely to evolve . The young would learn language perfectly well, rapidly assimilating words such as cup and chair. But when one of them tried to ask its parents questions about what it was experiencing, it would draw a blank. It could not even utter the sentence, "Why can't I talk about some things, daddy?" Any sentence that even alluded to experience would be blocked. (I don't mean that the creature's tongue would feel physically prevented from speaking; I mean that, while the creature would have experiences, and be cognizant that it was having experiences, it would never feel tempted to talk about them .) It's hard to believe that a brain could filter out just this set of sentences, mainly because it's doubtful that the set is well defined.
There is, however, another possibility. Suppose there was a species on a faraway planet for which the entire linguistic apparatus was disconnected from consciousness. These creatures can talk perfectly well, using languages just as rich as ours, but they do not know they can. Suppose creature A sees some buffalo and goes to tell creature B about it. He thinks (but not in words) I must go see B. B sees A coming. They stand near each other. After a while B realizes that A has seen some buffalo, and she decides what to do about it. However, B is unaware that A has told her about the buffalo. She knows that other people often bring information, but doesn't know how the information is transferred from one person to another. She knows that people often move their lips and make noises, but these.motions and noises have social or sexual significance, and everyone is of the opinion that that's the only significance they have .
On this planet, scientists might eventually realize that the signals coming from mouths contain much more information than is generally assumed .
By careful experimentation, they might figure out the code in which the information is carried . But figuring this out would not bring anything to consciousness. It would be analogous to our own investigations of neurons . We can, we believe, decipher the signals sent by neurons, but that doesn't make the content of those signals accessible to consciousness .
Eventually the creatures' civilization might have a complete theory of linguistics, and understand perfectly how their language functions . But for them the whole system has as much to do with consciousness as digestion does for us .
An unconscious natural-language system like this is not hard to imagine .
The computer programs that today carry on conversations on some topic are a far cry from full natural language, but one can imagine making ight get passed on to the next person. It could be clearly marked as m "hypothetical," so that the next person didn't think there actually was 11 ra-ragic rock. Soon everyone might be thinking about this hypothetical .
event sequence . The shared fantasy might contain a signal saying who t-tre original author was, although in this culture it's doubtful that anyone 1011ould care, even assuming that the concept of "original author" had any
meaning.
]'his species could not tell lies, however. Telling a lie involves an intenrc~n to get another creature to believe something that you know is false.
Srlppose a female of the species finds an attractive male and wants to conth -,eal his location from another female . She might deliberately walk in the la \;vn}rag direction or behave in some other misleading manner. However, ca I'm sure everyone will agree that it is difficult to imagine the mental lives of creatures like this, but there is a worse, and deeper, problem . We take for granted that there is such a thing as "the self," so that when I sketch the situations above, and I say, "A thinks such-and-such," we automatically picture a self like ours having a thought like that. The problem is that our concepts of self, thought, and language are so intimately intertwined. If we move language from one realm to another, how do we know that the self stays put, rather than necessarily following the language facility? In the scenarios I discussed above, I assumed that the language facility would be inaccessible to the self, but can we be sure that the language facility knows that? Suppose the language of the creatures had words for "I" and "you," and these words were used consistently, even when talking about mental events. Suppose sentences such as these were produced:
" "You told me the apples were ripe, but most of them are still green ."
" "From a distance, in that light, they looked red to me."
" "That story scared me ."
" "Why did the magician cast the spell on the rock?"
" "Why did you tell me C was over there?"
" "I thought he was; I must have been mistaken ."
One might rule them out, but it's not clear how. One might suppose that the sentence "They looked red to me" would be impossible, because language is disconnected from experience . However, if "why" questions cannot be asked and answered, it is not clear in what sense the creatures 1 +() Chapter 3 hli .,,c language at all. Besides, one can answer such questions without any V "direct access" to consciousness, as shown by the fact that the questions v;,)rk fine in the third person :
"``r > told me the apples were ripe, but most of them are still green." r( l, roln a distance, in that light, they looked red to D." Li ;Iguage, they would hear conversations with sentences like those above.
'I 17cy would naturally assume that there was nothing odd about the creatI.ffeN, . They could talk to them as they would to any speaker of a new 1<11Iguage . They would not realize that the "true selves" of this species wcre unaware that these conversations were taking place. Meanwhile, th . "true selves" would find that the new creatures were at first unable to ('0rt1rntmicate, but after a while they would be able to absorb and transrrtit. information just like the natives . The "true selves" would not, and 1)r-cstimably never could, realize that the earthlings' selves were connected t() language the way they are.
Under these circumstances, it is not at all clear exactly how we should describe what's going on. Rather than say that the creatures' true selves ar :, disconnected from language, perhaps it would be better to say that they each have two selves, one connected to language and the other not.
It we can say that about them, then how do we know we can't say it al out ourselves? How do we know there isn't a "true self" inside us that experiences lots of things, including some things we don't experience? The trtu self would know it got information from other people, but wouldn't re .llize that the transmission was mediated through vocal noises. There iruif;ht even two or more inaccessible selves inside every person. Needless to say , , these possibilities seem preposterous, but I think that ruling them (nit is impossible unless we have enough of a theory of consciousness to fiiid the conscious systems in the world. This is a subject we will return tc> ill Chapters 4 and 5 . it is purely a matter of third-person observation . It might be difficult to verify that it is present; the concept may require considerable revision as we understand intelligence better; but if our understanding advances as I expect, then testing whether a system exhibits virtual consciousness will eventually be completely uncontroversial, or at least only as controversial as testing whether a system has a belief.
What I would now like to claim is that real phenomenal consciousness and virtual phenomenal consciousness are indeed the same thing . Our brains maintain self-models with the required properties and that's why we think of ourselves, inescapably, as entities with emotions, sensations, and free will . When you have a sensation, you are representing a perceptual event using your self-model ; when you make a decision, you are modeling yourself as exempt from causality ; and so forth.
The evidence for this claim is simple, but it doesn't actually exist yet. I am anticipating the development of a more sophisticated cognitive science than we have now. When and if we have such a theory, I am assuming that it will involve many new computational constructs, but nothing above and beyond computation . What any given neuron does will be modelable as a computational process, in such a way that the neuron could be replaced by any other component that performed the same computation without ~.?
Cbapter 3 2atfecting the essential properties of the system . I am further assuming that clf-models of the sort I am describing will be found in human brains, and rrobably the brains of other mammals .
(f all this comes to pass, then we will be in a position to show without arty doubt that virtual consciousness exists in human brains . There won't 1-1ac any controversy about this, because virtual consciousness can be defMed and investigated in purely "third-person" terms . Every report of ã ;< nsation, every belief in the freedom of a decision, will be accounted for it computational terms (and, by reduction, in neurological terms when the system under study is biological) . The only way to deny that conscic:rUsness is identical with virtual consciousness will be to suppose that h,",), th are exhibited independently by the brain . Furthermore, in spite of oi~r intuitions that when we report a sensation we are reporting on consciousness, it will be indubitable that the reports can actually be explained pa. . i .re lv in terms of virtual consciousness . The belief that there is an additional process of consciousness will be very hard to sustain, especially ",, VC 11 a demonstration that one aspect of virtual consciousness is the way it creates powerful, inescapable beliefs.
Of course, we are not in the position to make this argument yet, and we may never be. Many people may wish ardently that we never get there; I sometimes wish that myself. Nonetheless, if that's where we're going we sniglit as well anticipate the consequences .
It is not easy to accept that the qualia-like entities robots believe in are iri fact true qualia . When I experience the green of a tree, the key fact about it, besides its shape, is that that the shape is filled with "greenness ."
The robot is merely manipulating data structures . How in the world could t')ose data structures exhibit a phenomenal quality like greenness? The key idelt is that the robot has beliefs about the contents of its visual field, and trie content of the beliefs is that a certain patch exists and is homogenously filled with something that marks it in some unanalyzable way as similar at Please don't construe my proposal as a claim that "real consciousness id doesn't exist ; there's only the virtual kind." This would be analogous to concluding that nothing is really alive (because life is just a set of chemical ut reactions, no different in detail from chemical reactions in nonliving systems), or that nothing is really wet (because liquids, like solids, are really e:-just atoms in motion, and atoms aren't wet) . Consciousness is real, but a turns out not to have all the properties we might have thought.
>r I have explained why a robot would model itself as having sensations, in and why, in a sense, the model would be accurate . But I haven't quite nsaid when it would be correct to say that a robot was having a sensation at now. In other words, I need to explain "occurrent consciousess," as opof posed to "the capacity for consciousness ." The definition should be fairly nobvious: A sensation is a particular perceptual event as modeled in the d robot's self-model . Exactly what constitutes a particular perceptual event dis not specified by the definition, but that's not important ; it's whatever ly the model says it is . When the robot sees a sunset, it might in one instant be experiencing "sunset sensation," in the next a sensation caused by one cloud in the sunset, in the next the sensation of a particular spot of orange .
VC
Any particular occurrence of a modeled perceptual event is a sensation, 1 just as any particular occurrence of a decision modeled as exempt from VC causal laws is an act of free will.
One consequence of this picture is that any perceptual event that is re unmodeled does not involve a sensation . Obviously, perception does not ct cease simply because it is itself unperceived, but perception and conscious-." ness are not the same thing. A thermostat reacts to high temperatures, but Id is not conscious of them. A thermostat that modeled itself in terms of sensations would, according to my theory, be conscious, but on occasions ad when a temperature measurement failed to make it to the self-model, ;Lv there would be no more reason to suppose that it was conscious of that ar measurement than in the case of an ordinary thermostat. m
For some people, all of this will be maddeningly beside the point, ey because it appears that I have simply neglected to explain what needs exis planing, namely the actual qualitative character of my (or your) he experiences . As Levine (1983 Levine ( , 1997 The answer is they don't; they couldn't . The theory explains why you hive an ineradicable belief in those qualia, and therefore why there is Clothing else to explain. When you think about your own mind, you use a s,Af-model that supplies many beliefs about what's going on in that mind.
The beliefs are generally useful, and generally close enough to the truth, but even when they are manufactured out of whole cloth they are still undoubtable, including the belief that "stop" lights look like this and ¬;o" lights look like that.
Lycan (1997, p. 64) ii ,, our own case? . . . How do we know we "have the experience of red" over and a1 ,ovc our undergoing just such a process as I have described in this machine?
l he machine could think and print out "I see clearly that there is nothing easier t+)r n e to know than my own mind," and proceed to insist that "no matter what rur, theory and instruments might say, they can never give me reason to think rii,lt [ am not conscious here, now." . . . If someone now replies that we've only I)rovided the machine with the functional equivalent of consciousness, we may tl5i . . ., what more is required? ' (pp. 470-471) The idea that consciousness arises through the use of a self-model has , .l i so been put forth by Minsky (1968) , Hofstadter and Dennett (1981) , I)ennett (1991), and Dawkins (1989) .
There is a longer list of people who disagree with this whole family of theories . In the next chapter 1 . will discuss and refute their objections . 
